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Abstract
Outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) has obvious economic and political connections
between the recipient and donor countries. Such investment can benefit both sides and carry
certain costs to both, whether through global scrutiny or domestic struggles. This these seeks to
add to the ongoing discussion of China's OFDI to Africa by comparing China's investment
during its socialist period (1949-1976) and its post-socialist era (1977 – present). This
comparison reveals that China's foreign policy has transitioned from a socialist paradigm to a
capitalist one in the last seven decades, which brought significant changes in its OFDI policies
and practice. In the socialist paradigm, the case study is focused on Tanzania and Zambia, and
for the capitalist paradigm, the focus is Zambia and Sudan. The thesis argues that China's OFDI
strongly connects to its foreign policy, which in turn correlates to China's economic and political
agenda. Researching the paradigms then reveals how economic and political agendas impact the
recipient OFDI country, depending on China's motives.

2
INTRODUCTION
Since the 1950s, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has undergone radical political
and economic changes because it started as a socialist country and then transitioned to a marketbased economy with both capitalist and authoritarian characteristics. Not only has China evolved
in the past 70 years, but the world has experienced an increased emphasis on globalization,
which has brought upon international involvement between one another's countries through
political and economic means. China is one of many countries to experience globalization by
opening its borders to the West for trade in the 1970s. They then moved past their border to
expand their influence on the African continent to help resource China's growing economy.
However, their beginning interests in Africa were due to many African nations protesting
colonialism and Western influence, a key interest to China during their socialist movement and
anti-imperialist stance. China's interest in Africa originated in the Bandung Conference in 1955,
beginning our first socialist paradigm of China's foreign policy in Africa. Later on, with the
death of Mao Zedong in 1976, China's interest in Africa then changed from a shared interest
against Western imperialism towards an interest in the resource-rich continent to improve its
domestic economic development. Such a foreign policy transition paves the way for an economic
transformation towards a capitalist economy under Deng Xiaoping leadership. Soon afterward, in
1978, the Reform and Opening agenda opened China's economy to FDI and evolved China's
economic regime towards a more capitalist market. This paper defines China's socialist paradigm
as the system between 1955 and 1978 and the capitalist paradigm from 1979 to the present.
By looking at these two periods, before China became an economic powerhouse, and
after so, we can analyze how government and economic regimes influence foreign policy and
how such policies have impacted Africa. China's investment in Africa will be analyzed within
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these two paradigms by focusing on China's involvement in infrastructure investment projects.
The socialist paradigm analysis focuses on China's economic assistance in the Tanzania-Zambia
Railway, developed from 1971-1976, and the capitalist paradigm focuses on China's
infrastructure in Zambia's copper and Sudan's oil industry.
The Tanzania-Zambia Railway has been chosen for the socialist paradigm because it
represents an investment project that displays China's foreign policy and was one of the largest
investment projects during this time in Africa. China's investment in Zambia's copper industry is
also chosen because it allows us to delve back into Zambia and analyze which industry China is
currently interested in and for what reasons. There is also extensive research on China's
investment in Zambia's copper industry, allowing us to compare the working conditions of both
locals and expatriates to those who worked on the Tanzania-Zambia railway. Such research
allows an in-depth analysis of the two. Lastly, China's infrastructure involvement in Sudan's oil
industry is important because it again demonstrates China's current foreign policy and how its
foreign policy has combined economic interest in raw resources. It also demonstrates how
China's political alignment with the nation's investment has evolved since the socialist
paradigms.
These projects demonstrate how China's ideology and strategies in foreign investments
have transitioned and offer us a chance to analyze how political and economic factors shape a
nation's OFDI policies. Currently, there is an increased concern of China's OFDI in Africa,
leading many to accuse China of colonizing Africa. A new analysis is then needed to understand
how China's infrastructure investment is affecting Africa differently, compared to when China
became involved in the socialist paradigm. By analyzing these two paradigms, this paper seeks to
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unearth how China’s political economy has impacted Africa while investing in infrastructure
projects and give a new understanding of China's current involvement with the continent.
This thesis consists of three sections: literature review, methods, and analysis. The
literature review looks at the existing literature regarding China's current political regime, market
economy, and soft power. The section is further broken down into three parts: China's modern
political system, China's modern economic system, and China's soft power and controversy of
OFDI in Africa. The methods section explains the analysis of the first and second paradigm, by
drawing on scholarly articles written in the 1970s-1980s regarding the Tanzania-Zambia Railway
and more recent articles about China's investment in Sudan and Zambia. The analysis section
then uses these secondary sources to build up an understanding of China's OFDI in the TanzaniaZambia Railway. There are five sub-sections: the beginning of China-Africa relationship, the
railway and the west, China's interest in the Tanzania-Zambia Railway, terms of the railway,
present-day China and Africa, Zambia's mining industry, Sudan's oil industry, and comparison of
the two paradigms. By analyzing the two paradigms, this paper seeks to demonstrate how
political regimes and economic systems greatly influence foreign policy and shape the OFDI
effects in the recipient countries.
LITERATURE REVIEW
This literature review first analyzes China's political and economic structures in the
socialist and capitalist paradigm, respectively. By doing so, the paper addresses how
globalization has affected its interest in investing in Africa. Secondly, I review the current
literature on how China's rising economic power has given them a form of soft power over
African nations, which feeds into China's current perception as a colonial state.
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The Political Economy of the Socialist Paradigm
Reviewing China's political economy in the socialist paradigm (1955 – 1978) is a
complicated feat and cannot be adequately done in this paper. The paper will then focus on the
political economy of specific policies, beginning with the Five-Year Plan (1953 -1957) to the
Cultural Revolution (1966 – 1976) to gain a general grasp of China's economic and political
changes the country endured while it was investing in the Tanzania-Zambia Railway.
The political revolution in 1949 established the People's Republic of China (PRC) and
began its path towards socialism with a state-controlled economy. To build a socialist country,
Mao led China by first creating the Five-Year Plan that held strong ideological roots in Marxism
and looked to the Soviet Union political model to establish many similar economic institutions.
China quickly transitioned into a state-controlled economy with an emphasis on physical targets
and quotas (Marshall, 1980) while centralizing almost all production into the government's
hands. The Five-Year-Plan was established in the 1950s because there was a push for early
transformation. Liu and Wang (2006) explain that Mao had four underlying factors to push for
such a transformation: requirements of national defense; the strength of the public sector in the
economy; the accumulated experience in the initial stages of transforming the private urban
sector, and the accumulated experience in developing socialist mutual aid and cooperative
institutions in the countryside (pp. 726).
All of these factors helped transform China's internal political and economic structure,
while also transforming the global perception of China as a socialist state. The Five-Year Plan
nationalized the private economy through means of creating state-private joint economic
activities (So, 2002). The joint venture between public and private sectors aimed to slowly
improve the economy and not shock private firms, who were told they would be allowed to carry
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out business under Communist rule from the 1940 New Democracy framework. So (2002) sees
the policies in the period of the 1950s summed up in three words which describe China's view of
the private sector: 'use' (liyong), 'restriction' (xianzhi), and 'transformation' (gaizao). In this sense,
China would only use the private economy to benefit the public sector and restrict its importance
without overshadowing the state sector. China's economic transformation described the socialist
change carried out through state capital. While So (2002) argues such a transition was gradual,
Nolan (1976) notes the transition was quite drastic. In Mao's agricultural co-overutilization
speech in 1955, 14% of peasants joined cooperatives while the remaining were still working in
their household system, and 18 months later, Nolan (1976) found almost all peasants had joined
the cooperatives.
At the end of the Five-Year Plan, China implemented a second Five-Year Plan (1958 –
1962), better known as the Great Leap Forward (GLF). The GLP was the product of many
economic and political pressures, i.e., fanmaojin policies, Hundred Flowers Movement, that left
Mao seeking economic growth through the agriculture and industrial sector (Teiwes, 1955).
China and the world predicted high expectations with the promise of industrial growth; however,
the GLP backfired with a decrease in grain output by 15% in 1959 and an additional 16% in the
following two years (Li and Yang, 2005). While bad weather is a plausible explanation, many
have pointed to the lack of labor and acreage distribution (Peng 1987; Yao, 1999). Additionally,
many have argued collective farming practices disincentivized farmers to work, leading to a fall
in production (Li and Zhang, 1997). Li and Yang (2005) find in an econometric study that the
government excess procurement of grain and resource diversion from the GLP contributed up to
61% of the decline in output.
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To add further hardship, tension had grown between the Soviet Union and China, marking
the beginning of a failed relationship. Radchenko (2010) outlines key events that led to a final
break in the Sino-Soviet alliance, including the Soviet Union supporting India in the Sino-India
border war (1959), using Chinese soil to build submarines and a military radio station, and
pulling out of deals to aid China's nuclear weapons program. The once-friendly relationship
broke in 1962 when Zhang Yan, deputy of the State Council Foreign Affairs Office, noted: "We
should get a clear and definite understanding that Khrushchev is a traitor, not a proletarian"
(Wang, 2005).
By the beginning of the 1960s, China was in dire need of a new economic policy, marking
the beginning of the Readjustment and Consolidation period (1960 – 1965). Such a period was
not led by Mao, but by the Politburo who sought to focus on industrial growth with the slogan
"take agriculture as the foundation and industry as the leading factor" (Brodsgaard, 1983).
Accumulation of capital decreased during this period, and heavy industry received the bulk of
state investment; however, technical transformation (irrigation, chemicalization, and
mechanization) received much investment, which helped the agriculture sector (Brodsgaard,
1983). While economic stability grew, there was a political conflict between Mao and other Party
leaders. Mao and political leaders were struggling over policy formulation, creating an identity
and moral crisis. In the 1960s, China had 17 million members, but roughly 20% of them had
joined the party before the establishment of the PRC (Neuhauser, 1967). An overwhelming
number of new members lacked experience, and many senior members believed they lacked a
sense of involvement, possibly due to the lack of experienced members to teach them. Neuhauser
(1967) remarks that top leaders, identified as 'Maoists,' saw these new members as a reservoir
with great revolutionary power, but more 'Rationalizers,' a group of political leaders whose trust
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in Mao's policy began to wane identified by Neuhauser, distrusted the new members because of
their lack of ideological understanding of the CPC. Additionally, the campaigns during the early
1960s caused political tension, where the Maoists saw them as crucial to reigniting revolutionary
momentum, while others saw them as disruptive (Neuhauser, 1967).
The divisiveness within the political system led to a tipping point marked by the Cultural
Revolution (1966 – 1976). In part, the Cultural Revolution originated in 1965, when Wu Han
stirred up political unrest with a play thought to attack (Neuhauser, 1967; Fisher, 1982). The
premise of the attacks stemmed from media and the lack of oversight given to those who were
considered supporters of the 'Rightist' group, those more lenient against class struggles who
struggled to accept the Great Leap Forward policies. A purge of political leaders soon followed,
causing "15 of the 49 major economic units to lose half of their known leaders, while 12 units
[had] no top officials who [would] appear in public" (Diao, 1970, pp. 66). Instead of political
leaders, Mao reinstated fewer intellectual leaders because higher education was seen as a classist
system (Diao, 1970). The Cultural Revolution then brought about a new political and social
change to "rid the Party of 'a faction of power holders who follow the capitalist road'" (Hook,
1967). To do so, Mao looked to its people and focused on the youth who had been becoming
more politically active. The Red Guard emphasized youth participation from five red categories
– workers, poor's and lower peasants, revolutionary cadres, and revolutionary martyrs (Heaslets,
1972). Soon, the Red Guards massive movements caused economic disruption by congesting
railways and increased the number of epidemics (Heaslets, 1972). During the height of the Red
Guards involvement, the most vehemently attacked were those found in high ranking political
positions and highly educated. The higher-education system also came under.
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The massive social and political changes the Cultural Revolution created came to a
tipping point in 1974 when economic decline and social unrest grew. Mao then looked to Deng
Xiaoping for guidance during the last years of his political leadership, until Mao died in 1976.
Thus, it marked the official end of the Cultural Revolution and the transition towards a marketbased economy under Deng Xiaoping leadership.The Political Economy of Contemporary China
China is currently considered a one-party, authoritative state ruled by the CPC because of
its authoritative deliberations when governing (He and Warren, 2011). He and Warren (2011)
describe China's deliberation in the local governments and their local elections, where local
governments are still elected by the ruling party, giving China an authoritative title. While
decentralization of the post-Mao era's political power stems from the local government
attempting to support local interests, it has, in turn, improved economic development (Chien,
2010). Chien (2010) argues that local governments have been given more economic
responsibility since 1978, seen through increased responsibility in trade and FDI activities.
Before the Cultural Revolution (1966 – 1976), China's highly centralized economic system,
known as tongshou tongzhi, gave all revenue from the local government to the central
government for budgeting (Lin and Liu, 1994). As Lin and Liu (1994) found in an in-depth
statistical study, economic decentralization effectively distributed resources. Through China's
national Open-Reform Policy beginning in 1978, local governments could embrace foreign direct
investment, and Special Economic Zones (SEZ) were created along coastal cities to encourage
trade; however, the SEZs were largely seen as unsuccessful because they were costly (Dijk,
2009).
As economic decentralization increased, China's economy grew at impressive rates,
through mainly a capitalist-based economy. Much of their success stemmed from its imports and
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exports, where both have increased dramatically, and China has become the main export of
manufactured goods (Wan, Lu, and Chen, 2007). China's accession to the WTO in 2001,
symbolized how the country had become internationally recognized as a powerful economic
country due to its increasing influence over trade and investment. Economic decentralization has
increased since 1978; however, it's important to note that political decentralization has not
increased as much as economics.
While China's government continues to be affiliated with domestic economic progress, its
foreign economic progress has also improved. Luo and Han (2010) explains how the government
transitioned from a regulator of foreign direct investment to a guide during China's Going
Abroad Policy beginning in 2000. Such a transition marks how the government is guiding
Chinese companies through regulation and is supporting them through subsidies while keeping
strong ties to the investing companies. This then expands China's presence outside, and into the
countries their state-controlled enterprises are investing in.
China’s Soft Power and the Controversy of OFDI in Africa
China's political and economic presence in the global economy has expanded with a
strong CPC ruling party and a growing decentralized economy. Before systematically reviewing
China's current position in Africa, it is important to note how it can integrate itself through
investment purposes in these countries. China's growing economic presence stems from its soft
power, whereby its opportunity to invest influences another nation's economy and politics.
Fijałkowski (2011) delves into China's form of soft power over Africa and explores its works. To
be considered a soft power, an actor must first have something that is considered of worth to the
other actor for the receiving company to give up something in return. In China's situation, it can
offer African nations attractive materials such as real capital as well as the respect of sovereignty
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to African countries. At the same time, African nations also have a form of soft power, but to a
lesser extent, by offering attractive materials such as raw minerals, oils, and cheap labor. Both
these agents offer attractive materials, but China holds a stronger soft power over African nations
because of its large economic power compared to many African nations.
Much of the power and involvement China has in African nations has given rise to global
concern over China's possible attempt to colonize Africa. Such accusations have risen since
China's Going-Out Policy created in 1999. The policy's main goal was to increase the presence
of Chinese companies in the global world by encouraging companies during the
internationalization process. Such assistance from the government makes China's globalized
firms unique from non-Chinese firms because the former are generally young (Kragelund and
Pieter van Dijk, 2009). Chinese firms are then more scrutinized from other nations because
government aid and intervention are often associated with state-owned enterprises that expand
outside of China (Yeh and Wharton, 2012). After the Go-Out Policy, globalized Chinese firms
had a unique perspective of making a long-term profit, rather than short-term profit (Kragelund
and Pieter van Dijk, 2009). China's long-term profit agenda while residing in a foreign nation
differs from Western companies, especially in Africa, because Western countries see long-term
profit plans as a potential economic threat to the host nation. These three distinctive traits in its
investment in Africa have drawn scrutiny from Western nations, giving rise to the neo-colonial
accusation against China.
However, China has been engaged with Africa before 1999 because of Africa's historical
liberation movements. China's interest in African stems from the Bandung Conference in 1955,
where political interests grew. Antwi-Boateng (2017) notes the Bandung Conference was a
'seminal' moment for the relationship between Asian and African nations because it established
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the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). While Antwi- Boateng believes this was the start of an
unequal partnership because it shifted from equal partners to power relations, especially with the
formation of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, Larkin (1971) views this event as
the beginning of a political relationship that encouraged an "aura of benignity" between all
involved nations. Wasserman (2012) further discusses how African nations saw socialist China
as a source of encouragement during their liberation against colonialism because of Mao's sense
of liberation from western power. During the socialist paradigm, China also had political
interests in the African nations because many post-colonial African nations and China shared
anti-imperialist and anti-West ideology stances. China then wanted to be seen as a leader for the
third world nations during their time of liberation and to add insult to the United States and the
Soviet Union for not winning the mainstay of African nations (Sircar, 1978). To demonstrate its
support, China gave aid to African countries through the form of zero-interest loans in
development projects that strengthened diplomatic relations (Sun, 2014). Such diplomatic
relations were useful in the United Nations when African nations voted to resume China's
membership in the UN because African nations represented one-third of the seats (Sun, 2014).
It is then interesting to note that China originally became involved with Africa to liberate
them from colonialism but are now accused of practicing neo-colonialism because of their
current relationship with many African nations in the capitalist paradigm. Wasserman (2012)
describes this rising "predator or partner" attitude towards China stemming from Western nations
due to China's rising economic and military competition in the global world. Zheng (2010)
further adds China experienced harsh Western economic sanctions in the 1990s and saw African
nations as a reliable partner that could connect China to the developing world. China then had
economic and political reasons to expand trade and investment in African nations. Mohan and
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power (2008) further add that Western and Chinese investment in Africa differs on media
grounds. Western investment is portrayed as a moral and philanthropic interest, whereas China's
interest stems from a business perspective. The clashing perspectives demonstrate how Western
countries and China view investment purposes in Africa differently and can reveal potential
patronizing undertones in Wester media; whereby, the West needs to help Africa by investing in
them for moral or philanthropic reasons.
On the other hand, China views investment in Africa as beneficial to both actors, but
there is some controversy if the benefits outweigh the costs. Dijk (2008) categorizes the goals of
China's OFDI to Africa into eight sections: assure materials of raw supply for China, create a
market for Chinese goods and services, obtain land for agriculture purpose, channel migration of
Chinese people to Africa, gain diplomatic support from African countries, provide an alternative
to Western development model, provide an alternative to Western development cooperation, and
emphasize China's status as a superpower. Such goals do not benefit African nations, and
instead, only benefit China through the expansion and gain of the market power. However, when
analyzing the potential benefits African nations gain from their relationship with China, Mohan
and Power (2008) note that China's aid programs emphasize social and economic group-based
rights while not focusing on other issues Western aid often includes aid designed to promote
democratic ideals. This then allows more flexibility for the receiving African nation when
accepting aid from China compared to Western aid. When analyzing the domestic consequences
of Chinese investment in African nations, Mohan and Power (2008) note Chinese merchants are
less likely to become involved in the local political issues, as long as they accrue wealth. Still,
competition between Chinese factories could lead to civil society organizations, such as labor
unions, from the locals. While China does not promote democratic values with its aid programs
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or investment strategy, it could potentially lead to democratic change depending on the African
nation regime's response. Such responses are analyzed in the case study of Sudan and Zambia,
where both nations experienced a rise in civil society organizations due to China's involvement.
METHODS
After laying out the background of China's political economy and its relationship with
Africa, the paper can now delve into the socialist and capitalist paradigms. To systematically
analyze the socialist paradigm, I rely on scholarly articles written from the 1970s - 1980s about
China's OFDI in Africa, specifically on the Tanzania-Zambia Railway. Such articles will serve as
primary sources because they give the reader a perspective of China before the country becomes
a competitive country globally. This view of China from primary sources is different from
China's current perspective because its investment projects from the socialist paradigm occurred
while China was a communist state with a state-controlled economy. China's interest in Africa
was considered less market-focused and rather seen as politically oriented.
In the capitalist paradigm section, I analyze China's current infrastructure investment in
Sudan's oil industry and Zambia's mining sector. Such data stem from secondary sources from
scholarly articles that have researched Zambia's mining industry and Sudan's oil industry.
Primary data from government sites is also collected to demonstrate Sino-Afro trade relations
during this paradigm.
ANALYSIS
The analysis builds an understanding of the case studies in Tanzania, Sudan, and Zambia
and also connects and differentiates the two paradigms. To do so, the first two sections analyze
the paradigms to build an understanding of the two and its associated case studies. The last
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section delves into how these paradigms differ and offer a new insight regarding how regimes
influence foreign policy practices.
The Socialist Paradigm
The Beginning of China-Africa Relationship
China's foreign policy affected African countries who received FDI, namely Zambia and
Tanzania, differently by creating a more symbolic gesture of assistance seen in the literature
created during this time of growing FDI infrastructure projects. Larkin (1971) analyzes China's
foreign policy from 1949-1970 and saw the Bandung Conference in 1955 as an important
moment in China's foreign relationship with Africa. This Conference was attended by multiple
countries from both Asia and Africa to discuss post-colonial rule and the challenges it brought.
While no official agreements were made between China and African nations, China's presence at
the Conference and their future support of African nations by officially recognizing them created
a strong political relationship and was an important symbol for future relations. Relationships
between China and African countries strengthened when the Premier Zhou En-lai toured Africa
from 1963-1964. Larkin (1971) explains the tour spread eight main principles of Chinese foreign
aid policy. The first two principals were the ideologies of equality and mutual benefit that also
respected the sovereignty of the recipient countries. Both were essential to creating mutual
respect from African nations, who had just revolted Western imperialism and colonization.
China's economic aid involved interest-free or low-interest to not burden recipient countries
whose goal was to not create a dependent relationship, but rather, make them more independent.
The fifth principle was China's aid in projects that required less investment and quick results to
help the recipient nation gain independence. China would also supply much of the equipment
and material that meets quality and quantity standards agreed by both parties. The seventh
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principle was that China not only gave technical assistance but also would teach the recipient
countries essential skills and techniques. Lastly, Chinese workers did not accept special
treatment and amenities but rather lived the same living standard as local workers who lived onsite on investment projects.
These goals were, in part, created to gain the trust and respect of African nations after
colonial rule. While China was pushing for a friendly relationship with African nations, China
had underlying political motives. Part of the motives for a relationship with Africa stemmed
from their desire to reduce the Soviet Union and Western influence in the continent. Sircar
(1978) explains that by involving themselves in Africa, China was attempting to be seen as the
champions of third world nations who can then take on a leadership role and offer a different
political route than what the West had to offer. China also gave special attention to African
nations who leaned towards socialism due to political alignment. By becoming more involved in
Africa, China was demonstrating a political move by creating a new global image for
themselves, fighting against imperialism, and branching out of Asia.
The Tanzania – Zambia Railway
Tanzania and Zambia had sought to build a railway connecting the two nations since 1952
for economic and political reasons, while both were under colonial rule by the United Kingdom.
Yu (1971) explains that the primary reason, from the perspective of the United Kingdom, was to
link the Rhodesia railway to the East African Railway. This would have expanded the UK's
political and economic presence on the continent. Additionally, Zambia's copper industry
depended on the Rhodesia railway and East African Railway before its independence in 1964.
Sircar (1978) states that 40% of Zambia's imports were from Rhodesia, now a territory of
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Zambia, and nearly all exports had to cross the Rhodes, when Zambia became independent of
colonial rule, there was then a push to seek an alternate route for additional economic autonomy.
Tanzania and Zambia sought a new railway because independence in Tanzania (1961),
Zambia (1964), and Rhodesia (1965), fractured economic and political structures. The lack of
economic and political integration that earlier colonialism created between nations had dissolved,
leaving the independent nations to strengthen their systems. The railway between Tanzania and
Zambia then sought to help improve economic and political relations as well as realign mutual
political interest with one another. While the World Bank, the Soviet Union, and Canada all
considered funding the railway, lack of communication and economic benefits led to little
action.
After Tanzania and Zambia both achieved post-colonial independence, China was quick
to recognize the new regimes and offered military and economic aid. To further strengthen
China's relationship with the countries, a Treaty of Friendship and trade agreements were made
in 1965 when Tanzania's president, Nyerere, visited Beijing. During this time, Tanzania began to
implement more socialist policies, further catching the attention of China. Yu (1977) explains
how Tanzania believed it best aligned with China's political experience and background due to
their previous colonial rule. Additionally, China's economic and political success appealed to
Tanzania, causing them to reject Western models of development and aimed to work with China
to build a society with equality in mind (Yu, 1977). China aligned with Tanzania's goals because
of its anti-imperialist foreign policy, and China hoped to gain a reputation as a leader of thirdworld nations.
China then reached out to Tanzania in August 1965 to survey the land and sent out 12
men. In response, Tanzania and Zambia created the Zambia International Committee; however,
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Zambia had yet to accept China's investment aid. It was not until a neighboring country,
Rhodesia, gained independence that Zambia agreed to China's economic aid. Once Rhodesia
gained independence, Zambia felt threatened because Mozambique, Rhodesia, and Angola were
experiencing internal changes that created unstable bi-lateral relationships. Zambia then feared
the internal disruptions and instability would cause disruption in the Rhodesia railway and
interfere with Zambia's trade. On September 5, 1967, China, Zambia, and Tanzania signed an
agreement in Beijing, and a full survey of the route began.
While building questions were answered in 1967, China did not mention how to finance
the project. Two more rounds of negotiation, in 1968 and 1969, took place in Dar es Salaam and
Lusaka. At the final negotiation in Lusaka in 1969, Tanzania, Zambia, and China decided to
connect Dar es Salaam in Tanzania to Kapiri-Mposhi in Zambia; however, Zambia did not fully
agree to the final negotiations. There is little information for why there was a delay, but the three
nations made a final agreement on July 12, 1970, in Beijing.
China agreed to finance the railway, but there were debates as to how much the loan
specifically was. Sircar (1978) notes that financing the project cost China $474 million, whereas
Yu (1971) described it as $401 million and, additionally, Larkin (1971) found it was $336
million. While the numbers all differ, the loan was the largest loan during its time, making it an
important economic and political loan. The loan would be paid in 30 years, beginning in 1973,
and would be partly paid through imports of Chinese goods, representing around 52%. There
were some doubts (Yu, 1971; Ogunsanwo, 2010) China would be able to export enough
materials to Tanzania and Zambia because China was experiencing the Cultural Revolution.
There were high-stakes against China if it could perform, and any failure would setback political
goals and weaken China's foreign policy and their global reputation. Larkin (1971) notes that if
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China were to be successful, it would "testify to Chinese skill, energy, and economic strength"
(pp. 101). While Larkin published his paper before the railway completed, construction officially
began on October 26, 1970, and was completed in 1976.
Financing workers to construct the railway was another dilemma all nations faced. Yu
(1971) notes Zambia's Finance Ministers estimated 15,000 - 20,000 men would be needed;
however, the number was a rough estimation, and the availability of skilled men in Tanzania and
Zambia was limited. In the end, Sircar (1978) was able to give the final numbers of employment
to 15,000 Chinese and 36,000 Africans. China supplied technical positions and 'on-job' training
for Africans, and 200 Zambian and Tanzanian students were sent to China for training. Such
training falls in line with China's foreign policy towards Africa, demonstrating its commitment to
keep a strong political relationship.
The Capitalist Paradigm
China and Africa in the Present Day
As already discussed, China has greatly expanded its OFDI to African since 1999 with the
Go-Out Policy. After the Go-Out Policy, trade and OFDI greatly increased, as seen in Figure 1.
The continued expansion of China's OFDI to Africa contributes to ongoing bilateral trade
agreements, which have strengthened their political and economic relationship between the
country and continent. In 2000, Chin and African nations created the Forum on China - Africa
Cooperation (FOCAC) to further establish economic and trade relations; and it was successful
because the Cooperation encouraged communication between political actors and commercial
enterprises for all members (Beule and den Bulcke, 2009). Such an alliance also created clear
principles of equality and mutual benefits found in the nine key principles: abide by local laws,
bid for contracts based on transparency and equality, protect labor fights of local employers,
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protect the environment, and implement corporate responsibilities (Ndulo, 2008). It would be
interesting to note how the principles give much autonomy and protection to Africa because of
China's economic soft-power. However, this foreign policy differs from Larkin's (1971) outlook
of China's foreign policy in the socialist paradigm because it doesn't emphasize equality between
actors. The socialist paradigm emphasized development through equality, whereby the principles
in Beule and den Bulck (2009) illustrate the autonomy of the African states.
Even with the new foreign policy towards Africa, China is critiqued for not following
through with them. One area of critique is China's promise to promote labor rights and abide by
local laws. One of the biggest investments in Africa from China are manufacturing projects,
much of which rely on many Chinese workers and local African workers. Jauch (2011) shows
that the majority are African workers; however, the local workers receive below minimum wage.
Upon further analysis, Jauch (2011) points out that many African locals work as "casual
workers," whereby they do not have a legal right to social security, minimum wage, and housing
or transport allowance. Low wages are common in sectors without unionization, and Jackson
(2014) has found industries with strong union representation have incomes higher than the
national average. Jauch and Sakaria (2009) further find that Chinese employees "resorted to
unfair labor practices, including paying less than the legal minimum wages, victimization and
unfair dismissals." Chinese industries in Namibia commonly use such practices, especially
regarding manufacturing, as well as a rise in "union bashing" whereby Chinese firms would
forbid unions to form. It seems that China does not uphold its foreign policy stance with Africa
in the capitalist paradigm, which the paper will analyze in the case study of Zambia and Sudan.
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Zambia’s Mining Industry
Zambia is one case that demonstrates China's investment in Africa, and in this specific
case, China has been investing in its mining and manufacturing industry through the purchase of
mines and the creation of manufacturing buildings. All of which creates a controversy over its
laborer's rights and role in Zambia's economy. It's important to analyze the soft power China has
within Zambia because of Zambia's lack of capital goods, especially in the mining industry.
China has been able to fuel the mining industry with capital investment and increase the price of
copper before it had drastically fallen to unprofitable levels (Lee, 2017). China is then seen as a
source of value to Zambia, giving China a soft power over Zambia. In turn, Zambia's raw
resources are highly sought-after by China due to its growing economy and demand for
resources.
Before China began investing in the copper mining industry, the price of copper fell
dramatically in the 1990s; however, once China invested in the copper sector, the Zambian state
decided to privatize the industry. The privatization of the mining industry led Chinese owned
enterprises to own an estimated 15 of Zambian mines by 2011 (Anyanwu, 2012). Zambia owned
only a minority of mines because India owned 20.6%, and Swiss and Canada owned 10% of the
mines. Additional ownership by South Africa, the United Kingdom, and Kazakhstani was also
found (Anyanwu, 2012). Such Chinese ownership is through the companies of the Chambishi
Copper Mine, China Luanshya Mine, Chambishi Copper Smelter, and Sino Metals. These
companies are owned by the China Non-Ferrous Metals Mining Corporation (CNMC), which
was established in 1983 and held as much as 85% of all shares in 2010 (Chama, 2010). The
creation of the CNMC came about when China needed copper and other minerals to help
develop its growing industrial economy in the mid-1980s. Since then, the CNMC has been able
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to push for further economic relationships with Zambia by creating Multi-Facility Economic
Zones and economic and trade cooperation zones, all of which follow their capitalist agenda of
gaining more raw-resources through bi-national trade agreements (Alves, 2011). In addition to
China's involvement in the mining industry, Chinese sponsored firms have also created a
Mulungushi textile factory, agriculture industries, and a hospital. Chinese state-owned
enterprises establish many industries in such areas, who either own or co-own capital-dense
projects. In the case of the Mulungushi textile factory, it is co-owned by the Chinese state-own
enterprise, Qingdao Textile Corporation, and the Zambia Ministry of Defense. The joint-venture
creates the Zambia-China Mulungushi Textiles Joint Venture Ltd. (Brooks, 2010). China and
Zambia have additional economic relations, seen through its bilateral trade agreement. One of
which is the Zambia-China Chambishi Trade and Economic Zone, which reduced tariffs and
increased trade and investment. China's contribution to Zambia can be seen as positive because
China can add much-needed capital and additional jobs to the economy. Additionally, the mining
industry may not have grown without China's investment in the sector because it is seen as a
catalyst since Zambia lacked capital resources to grow the industry (Kragelund, 2009). However,
Kragelund (2009) found Chinese owned mines had the worst health and safety conditions.
However, such involvement has also brought criticism. The labor conditions of mining
workers are described as dangerous and demoralizing due to the slave-like atmosphere and
pressure to reach quotas (Lee, 2018). Additionally, the laborers receive low wages and are often
not given lunch breaks until quotas are reached (Lee, 2018). There is little protection to the local
laborers because unions were decentralized before China invested in the copper industry. It's
important to understand that the lack of union rights already existed when China purchased many
mines and businesses due to Zambia's political regime during the 1990s. China then did not have
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any notable influence over the union rights when they had fallen, yet, this is not to say that China
does not play a role currently. China often has weak or nonexistent union organizational rights
when investing in another nation, and its lack of support or action to support unions has led to no
active role in Zambia (Keet, 2008).
China also practices employment discrimination called the "colored glass ceiling" where
expatriates hold higher-status positions, even when 85% - 94% are locally hired. This creates a
power dynamic between foreign and local workers, which stems from the colonial era. Chinese
companies justify their discrimination by explaining that the locals lack experience and using a
Chinese-proficiency test. In an attempt to cover up their discrimination, as Lee (2018) finds, the
Chinese corporations created jobs that sounded important, but in reality, have no real business
power.
While China brings many economic contributions to Zambia through its investment in the
mining and other industries, the costs must be realized and analyzed. It appears as if the social
costs - employment discrimination, health and safety dangers, and possible halt on union rights have created a power-imbalance between Zambia and China due to China's capital investment.
China does not uphold the key principles from the FOCAC meeting; however, there have been
no major repercussions against China from Zambia. A reevaluation of the key principles is
needed between the Zambian and Chinese government to address the social costs and maintain a
healthier, more balanced relationship between the nations. Additionally, the Zambian
government should better enforce health and safety rights for workers, especially in the mines, to
uphold their autonomy within the state.
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Sudan's Oil Industry
China's search for raw resources to fuel its growing economy has led them to Sudan due
to the nation's reserve of oil. Its initial relationship with Sudan involved supplying military arms
in 1970 to the socialist dictator Jafar Nimairi (Srinivasan, 2008). Sudan then saw China as an ally
who it could turn to in need, while the West condemned Sudan's authoritarian rule through the
use of economic sanctions and high tariffs. In 1989, Western scrutiny towards both China and
Sudan was high because of Tiananmen Square and a military coup occurring in Khartoum.
Increased isolation from the West made these two countries look towards each other, but with
more caution from China due to Sudan's political uncertainty. While China supplied Sudan's
arms and gave it aid to build government buildings, China's interest shifted towards the oil sector
in the late 1990s when the SOE China National Petroleum Corporation collaborated with the
National Oil Corporation.
As seen in Figure 2, imports of oil grew in 2000, and by 2006, Sudan had become China's
African top third trade partner (Srinivasan, 2008). However, with large oil investment in Sudan,
there was much controversy due to Sudan's human rights violations, and it was impossible to
disentangle China's support in the oil industry and China's support for the elite government
breaching those human rights. In 2004, an armed rebellion against the Sudanese government was
at full force, and the United States accused the Sudanese government of genocide. While many
countries issued sanctions against Sudan, China did not, and many accused China of acting
indifferent to Sudan's human rights violations but continuing their investment in the oil industry.
China's attempts to give Sudan's sovereignty by separating politics from business is captured
perfectly in the famous statement given by China's foreign minister, Zhou Enzhing, "business is
business. We try to separate politics from business...the internal situation in Sudan is an internal
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affair, we are not in a position to impose upon them" (Srinivasan, 2008, pp. 67). While China
attempted to distance themselves from politics, their investment in oil is political itself because
the oil revenues go towards the human rights violators, the elitists.
Other investment FDI projects, such as the construction of highways, dams, and railroads
and other energy industries, also carry additional negative consequences. One of the most
notable infrastructure projects was the $1.8 billion Merowe Dam, a joint venture between the
China National Water Resources and Hydropower Engineering and China Water Engineering
Company (Manji, 2007). The Merowe Dam caused the displacement of 50,000 small farmers
along the riverbank and were forcibly removed from the police. Manji (2007) maintains that
China was partly responsible for the resettled farmers, and China had forbidden the local
Manasir nomads to drink from its connected wells. Ali Askouri (2008) explains China wished to
keep the water for domestic use and project building components. When a gathering held by
locals formed, many Chinese workers tipped off the Sudanese government, which was later
raided by government officers. Manji (2007) sees China as not a protectorate of locals but rather
enforces the elite, political group in Sudan, thus, disregarding human rights violations.
China's involvement in Sudan has then brought upon high levels of social costs because of
the indirect support against human rights and the displacement of locals. While China benefits
from their relationship with Sudan because of the amount of oil it imports, their investment in oil
and other areas has caused massive disruption in the locals' lives. However, it should be expected
that China would not hold Sudan accountable for its human rights violations because Sudan's
one-party, authoritarian political regime aligns with China's, giving China a low opportunity cost
in dealing with Sudan. Their aligned political regimes and indifference to democracy, makes
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these two countries have similar interests; China then has no interest in influencing Sudan's
already similar regime and, by doing so, potentially hinder their oil investments.
Comparison of the Two Paradigms
China's involvement in Africa in the 1970s to the present has dramatically changed due to
political and economic motives in foreign policy and economic growth. To analyze China's
foreign policy over the decades in Africa, this section compares China's Tanzania-Zambia
Railroad to its investments in Zambia and Sudan today. The key differences found include
political agenda and political involvement, local economic and policy impact, and global media
attention.
Political Agenda and Political Involvement
One key difference between the two paradigms is how China expresses its political
motives. In the socialist paradigm, China had a political agenda when investing in Tanzania and
Zambia because it wished to empower their anti-imperialists and anti-colonial movements
sweeping throughout the continent. The Bandung Conference in 1955 and Chou En-lai's tour
from 1963-1964 highlighted their anti-imperialist stance and willingness to cooperate with
African nations economically, while at the same time giving the countries autonomy, a key
ideology in their foreign policy. The Tanzania-Zambia railway was China's largest project at the
time to demonstrate their commitment against anti-imperialism, while simultaneously fighting
against the two hegemonic states, the United States and the Soviet Union.
In contrast, China did not invest itself in Sudan and Zambia for political reasons, but
rather, for economic reasons. While it does not appear that China has a political agenda when
conducting OFDI in Africa in the capitalist paradigm, it has become more politically involved in
the case of Tanzania and Zambia. With Sudan, China's lack of personal responsibility in
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investing in an authoritarian regime that is breaking human rights has caused global outrage
because China's involvement in the oil industry empowers the elite groups violating human
rights. However, China declares that it values Sudan's political autonomy and has rarely actively
involved themselves in politics. While China may not be directly involved in Sudan's politics, it
continues to influence policy-making decisions by empowering the current regime through its
investment in the oil industry. While both paradigms advocate autonomy to the recipient
countries, China's current investment in Zambia has led to a blending of political involvement.
With Chinese embassies leading mining investment projects in Zambia and the Chinese owned
mining industries in Zambia, it is difficult for China to not get involved in politics as well.
It is then important to note that the two paradigms portray different political motives. The
motive behind China's interest in Africa has changed drastically from as the main reason behind
investment to little reason behind the investment. However, it's important to note that China
itself is a one-party authoritarian regime, so working with another country, such as Sudan, who
share similar political regimes could be beneficial to China. By working with a country with a
similar regime, Sudan holds China to fewer obligations in regard to democratic values and other
commitments that may not align with their regime practices. On the other hand, there are little
political involvements during the Tanzania-Zambia railroad compared to the amount of
involvement in modern-day Zambia and Sudan. While China emphasizes that it values African
nation's state autonomy, it undervalues the rules and regulations in Zambia and promotes the
elitist group in Sudan. In a sense, China respects Sudan's autonomy by promoting its regime.
Still, its investment does not promote the public's basic human rights, which must be addressed
in its foreign policy to African nations.
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Local Economic and Policy Impact
China, Zambia, and Tanzania created the Tanzania-Zambia Railway to improve
economic growth along its path and, in doing so, improve the economic growth of Zambia and
Tanzania. Zambia would also gain economic independence from the Tanzania-Zambia railways
because it would not need to use the Rhodesia railway, which it had been overly dependent on
for exports and imports. Additionally, communication and technology would be accessed more
easily in capital-poor regions (Bailey, 1975). While the regions were capital-poor, there was a
surplus of labor that allowed Tanzania, Zambia, and China to pool in their laborers. Bailey
(1973) notes Chinese expatriates were involved in directing and constructing the railways itself,
while expatriates filled no government positions. Furthermore, Bailey (1973) explains how the
Chinese workers in Tanzania asked to lower their wages to £5.00, no matter the position,
reinforcing the idea of equality between the nations. However, further research did not reveal if
the requested pay was reinforced. However, the request is an important economic aspect of
China's involvement in the railway because it demonstrates how Chinese workers wished to be
equals, an important ideology created in the Treaty of Friendship in 1965 and previous meetings.
We can see a drastic difference when comparing China's investment in the socialist
paradigm to the capitalist paradigm. In the capitalist paradigm, China has been focusing on longterm investment projects that have had long-term consequences with Chinese companies
involved. In Zambia, the mining industry had only risen because of China's catalytic involvement
by purchasing mines and creating the Chambishi smelter and more. By doing so, it employed
many local workers as well as Chinese workers, but the power-dynamic has not remained as
equal as it once was in the Socialist paradigm. Research shows Chinese companies pay locals
under the government minimum wage and do not meet health and safety requirements or job
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compensations. Additionally, locals receive low-paying jobs, while expatriates are often given
jobs with higher titles. There is no longer a sense of equality between Chinese expatriates and
locals, once felt in the 1970s. Such inequality gives rise to the accusation of China's neocolonization because it is enforcing unequal racial power-dynamics through the function of
economics.
However, it's important to remember that China can continue paying low wages, hiring
expatriates for high-status positions, and curtailing safety laws because Zambia lacks policy
enforcement. This stems from Zambia's high level of corruption and a weak institutional
framework that allows China to abuse the system (Lee, 2017). To redress this situation, local
governments must strengthen through due process. It would be unreasonable to expect China to
address this issue within the country because it would go against its foreign policy of respecting
the autonomy of the state as well as hinder their mining investments. If China were to promote
due process within Zambia and Sudan, it would go against foreign policy and hurt economic
interest. However, this does not mean change will not occur within the local community, but the
change would come from locals and possibly government officials.
The capitalist paradigm also reveals how China does not consider the general public's
interest, as seen in the case in Sudan. China commonly breaks labor rights in Zambia and human
rights in Sudan. China acts as a promoter of Sudan's government because the regime profits off
of China's oil investment. Their investment in oil then indirectly encourages the regime and the
regime's treatment to its citizens. China's oil investment in Sudan heavily contrasts the TanzaniaZambia railway because China is not promoting an industry that benefits the general public. The
Tanzania-Zambia railway improved communication, economics, and political relationships
between the two African nations, while oil investment appears to benefit the government elites
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solely in Sudan. It appears the good of the nation's people is not part of China's foreign policy
when it comes to investment strategies in Sudan.
Global Media Attention
China's interest in Africa has dramatically changed over the past decades, and so has the
world's attitude. From the readings of journal articles written in the 1970s-1980s, there is general
approval of China's investment in the Tanzania-Zambia Railway because of China's foreign
policy stance, emphasizing self-resilience, fighting against Western colonialism, and granting
economic aid to emphasize economic and political autonomy within the global world. During the
1970s, China's role as a leader of third world nations was applauded by many scholars because
China was encouraging economic growth (Yu, 1977; Sircar, 1978; Bailey, 1973). Yu (1977)
notes that China has been able to help many African countries develop in a short period because
it is receptive to African policies and collaboration. The Tanzania-Zambia Railway demonstrates
China's receptiveness by granting loans and aid to the investment project and working with
Tanzania's and Zambia's government to address logistics, which would be beneficial to all actors.
All of these occurred during China's Cultural Revolution, further proving China is a reliable
leader because it had been able to invest in the Tanzania-Zambia Railway while going through a
socio-political movement. China was not only a perceived leader of third world nations, but
China has pushed an image of a protector and supporter of liberation within Africa during the
continent's movement against colonialism (Rettman, 1973). The railway was then seen as a
symbol against Western-imperialism and as political and economic independence from Western
power. China's emphasis on self-reliance during the construction of the railway for ex-patriots,
Chinese workers, and the locals themselves.
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China's investment has taken a different perspective in the eyes of Western countries and
the African countries themselves. The ongoing debate on whether China is colonizing Africa has
risen in the past years due to China's interest in raw resources, such as oil in Sudan and copper in
Zambia. The shift in perspective from China acting as a leader for third world nations to a
possible colonizer of African nations has partly stemmed from Western countries' foreign
relationship stance with China. As China's economic presence has grown in the global economy,
so has its level of danger to hegemonic nations, such as the United States. While Western forces
have scrutinized China's investment, it is important to note that the amount of money China
invests in Africa is far less than Western nations.
As Figure 3 displays, the amount of investment in Africa from China is not the concern,
but rather the growth of Chinese investment. Part of the alarm is due to China's no-interest loans
and unique long-term investment plans. In Zambia, China invests in the long-run with its copper
mining companies and the oil industry in Sudan. Rather than investing in projects created by the
African country, China has evolved its investment approach to long-term plans, which has
changed the perspective of China's involvement in the African nations.
CONCLUSION
China's OFDI has evolved over the seven decades alongside its political regime and
economic system. Such change offers a unique study on how OFDI in China connects to its
political and economic regimes, which in turn correlates to foreign policies. China provides a
unique perspective because of the drastic economic changes it has experienced in the last
decades and has maintained economic relations with African countries while transitioning from a
socialist state to a capitalist one. By juxtaposing both the socialist and capitalist paradigms, this
paper reveals how the ideology of equality, political motive, impacts in the recipient nation, and
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global attention has changed due to foreign policy. Since China had an ideology more aligned to
equality during its socialist paradigm, its OFDI impact in Tanzania and Zambia had many more
economic benefits than social costs, wherein the capitalist paradigm, the opposite is true. And
while China had political motivation to invest itself in Africa, it has little political motivation
today; instead, it finds itself indirectly influencing Sudan and Zambia's government and citizen
rights. It is also important to understand China's OFDI in Africa because of the scrutiny it is
under by Western countries in the capitalist paradigm, referencing the neo-colonial argument
against China's OFDI in African countries. While China's OFDI to African countries creates
many costly impacts, it could be the by-product of a capitalist-driven country. This paper then
attempts to draw a connection between a nation's political and economic regime to their foreign
policy stance, and how that stance impacts OFDI, especially in the recipient country.
The thesis also adds to the conversation on how power dynamics between countries are
revealed in FDI is and how some countries, often those with more soft-power, can be seen as
exploitive. The power inequality between well-structured, capitalist nations, and nations with an
unstable government and economic regime are highlighted in this thesis. It is then essential to
realize that capitalist countries can often have stronger soft-powers than the nations they invest
in, especially when the receiving nation is more instable politically and economically. If the
capitalist nation does not address the power inequality, OFDI can be a source or can encourage
social costs within the receiving OFDI country.
Realizing the power-dynamics in FDI is essential because policy action must be enforced
by both partnered nations to protect the economic interest of both governments and the lives of
locals who are impacted by OFDI. Receiving countries of OFDI must have an enforcement
policy to hold the foreign industries accountable for labor rights and environmental impact.
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Additionally, the receiving nations should consider how the foreign companies could benefit the
locals by sponsoring community outreach programs. Pushing for such policies when negotiating
FDI is important because it protects its local communities and often falls in line with both
country's foreign policies. Community-outreach programs by foreign firms would also greatly
benefit the local community by offering building trust between the two and could develop
essential work. Doing so would improve the relationship between the locals and foreign
industries, and it would make the capitalist nation more socially responsible. While OFDI can
demonstrate power-inequality between nations, it does not necessarily have to occur.
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Appendix
Figure 1: China OFDI to Africa (US$ Bn Unadjusted)

Data from Data: Chinese and American FDI to Africa (2020)

Figure 2: China Import of Oil from Sudan

Data from OECD: Products that China imports from Sudan (1962-2017)
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Figure 3: Top Investors in Africa, 2011 and 2016

Figure from WIR-Foreign direct investment to Africa fell by 21% in 2017, says United
Nations report
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